Israel’s 12-Day war with Iran: A Critical Evaluation

On June 13, the Iranian people woke up in shock as Israel launched a surprise attack on Iran. This surprise attack, coinciding with the ongoing U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations and followed by the rhetoric of the U.S. President signalling his support for the Israeli strikes, led many hardliners in Iran to conclude that the nuclear talks were merely a trick by President Trump to deceive Iran. Nevertheless, Israel’s attacks succeeded in causing massive damage to Iranian military assets, killing top military generals and nuclear scientists, significantly degrading air defence capabilities, and striking the crown jewels of the Iranian state: its ballistic missile stockpile and nuclear sites. However, despite all this, many military strategists are calling this 12-day war a strategic setback for Israel.

Their argument rests on the ideas of military strategy and political realism, shared by many strategists and historians, including the renowned Carl von Clausewitz, who said, "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means." War is not an end in itself but merely a means to achieve political objectives. Since Israel initiated the war with certain political objectives, it was necessary for Israel to fulfil those objectives before claiming victory.

Even though Israel succeeded in causing significantly more damage to Iran than vice versa, by the time a ceasefire was agreed upon, the two major objectives of the war, dismantling Iran’s nuclear programme and toppling the Islamic regime, remained unfulfilled. In fact, its attack appears to have had the opposite impact on Iran. Thus, the claims of victory by Israel’s PM and Trump appear unconvincing.

Additionally, after the attack, Israel infamously became the first state to launch an attack on an advanced nuclear programme, a move fraught with the risk of catastrophic consequences, including radioactive leaks, environmental contamination, and severe public health crises for the attacked state. It also broke the taboo in international relations around striking advanced nuclear programmes and violated the territorial sovereignty of a state, acts considered a crime under international law. These actions are likely to further deepen Israel’s international isolation.

But despite executing its aggressive military plan sophisticatedly and having the full political and logistical support of the most powerful military in human history, the United States, how did Israel still fail in achieving its targets?

The first objective of the attack was the obliteration of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, for which Israel even succeeded in dragging the U.S. to strike several Iranian nuclear sites such as Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. Iran has spent billions of dollars building its nuclear sites. If we include the economic sanctions Iran suffers because of its nuclear programme, the costs would be even higher. But the regime has presented it as a matter of national pride. So, did the Israeli and U.S. attacks destroy that pride? The answer is probably no. Early U.S. and European intelligence reports have suggested that Iran's nuclear capabilities have not been entirely eliminated, at most, set back by a year or two. If satellite images taken a few days before the U.S. attack on Iranian nuclear sites are to be believed, Iran had transferred its sensitive equipment, including highly enriched uranium, from the key sites prior to the attacks. Moreover, Iran still possesses enough human capital and technical know-how to repair its damaged nuclear programme and start building bombs.

Add to that, Iran has suspended its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and is holding serious discussions about withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This suggests that the attacks have hardened the attitude of Iranian leaders regarding building a nuclear bomb.

In 2003, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa halting the Iranian nuclear weapons programme. This, within the Iranian political system, is viewed as strong an indictment against nuclear weapons as possible coming directly from the ideological leadership. But after the recent war, there is a high probability that the Supreme Leader may change his mind, because the Israeli and U.S. strikes have exposed Iran’s vulnerabilities. Having damaged Iranian air defence capabilities, ballistic missiles and drone manufacturing facilities, both the U.S. and Israel struck Iran wherever they wished. If Iran doesn’t want to become another Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, or Palestine, regions whose territorial integrity is regularly violated by Israel, it must develop deterrence. In the absence of economic strength to build strong conventional military capabilities, and given the possibility of an immediate Israeli attack, a nuclear bomb, almost within reach if the political will exists, may appear to be the easiest path to deter future Israeli and U.S. attacks.

Similarly, David Minchin Allison, writing for Foreign Affairs, has pointed out that history has shown how conventional military attacks on nuclear programmes rarely achieve their targets and tend to harden the desire of a state to build nuclear weapons. Military strikes may set back the nuclear capabilities of a state, but they increase the insecurity of a state, which leads it to actively move towards building a nuclear bomb. He explained that building a nuclear weapon requires both physical capabilities and political will. While strikes only hit the former, they end up increasing the latter.

Allison presents the example of Israel’s strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981. Initially, the strikes were dubbed a success, but they turned out to be counterproductive, as the military strikes only destroyed the reactors, not the political will. It hardened Saddam Hussein's desire to build nuclear weapons. Consequently, he deployed more resources into building a nuclear bomb. By 1990, Iraq was very close to building a nuclear bomb. But Saddam’s own aggressive, expansionist moves ultimately spelled disaster for him and his nuclear programme. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the international community imposed strict bureaucratic and legal controls on the country. The United Nations enforced comprehensive sanctions and its intrusive inspection regime that eventually oversaw the destruction of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.

He argued that though many pro-strike strategists point to the case of the Syrian nuclear programme, where Israel permanently eliminated Syria’s Al-Kibar reactor in 2007, they fail to notice that the Syrian nuclear programme was not domestic. The reactor was imported wholesale. Syria lacked the domestic capabilities to replicate it and critically relied on foreign assistance, unlike the Iranian nuclear programme. Later on, other calamities awaited the Syrian regime, such as the drought and the Syrian civil war, which never gave the regime the opportunity to demonstrate what it intended to do after the strikes.

Some scholars argue that Iran, now economically and militarily weakened after these attacks, will focus on improving relations with the West and its economy, which will require giving up its nuclear programme. But what these scholars are missing is that whenever a state has a choice between economic development and survival, it will always choose the latter.

Israel’s second objective was to topple the Iranian regime, but today, the regime appears more popular and secure than it was before June 13. However, there is little doubt that the regime’s authoritarian and repressive nature, coupled with rising economic distress, has contributed to its unpopularity within Iran. The rejection of hardline candidates, closely aligned with the Supreme Leader, in favour of moderates whenever such a choice is permitted in elections since 2013, and the widespread support for the anti-hijab movement following the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022, both underscore this reality: that the Iranian regime remains deeply unpopular among Iranians.

The revolution that toppled Shah Pahlavi, a Western-backed dictator, and brought a revolution in Iran, was a combined movement involving liberals, leftists, and Islamists. But later, the Supreme Leader, due to the organised nature of his group, purged people of other ideologies and consolidated his rule in Iran. The eight-year-long Iran-Iraq War further helped him consolidate his power. Thus, it is accurate to state that the majority of Iranians never desired the kind of theocratic state we see today in Iran.

However, what Western commentators often miss is that the Iranian people’s dislike for their regime doesn’t automatically translate into unquestioned support for the U.S. or Israel. There is no such binary in Iranian society, whether you're with the regime or with the U.S. Iran is an ancient nation, unlike many neighbouring Arab countries carved out by colonial powers. Iranians have a strong sense of nationalism, which makes them unlikely to welcome Western interference in their internal affairs, especially attacks on their hospitals, universities, and housing societies. Therefore, if Israel's objective was to ignite public anger against the weakened regime and create a mass uprising, it has not only failed but has produced the opposite impact on Iranian society. Now, people are more sympathetic to the regime and strongly united behind it than they were before June 13.

Historical evidence also proves that an external attack on a state tends to increase nationalist sentiments, leading citizens to rally behind the national flag. This effect has often helped unpopular governments stage a comeback and implement their policies more ruthlessly. We have seen this happen all over the world, from Pakistan after its recent war with India, to Russia during its war with Ukraine and the U.S. after 9/11.

Moreover, toppling a regime solely through air power was an unrealistic goal. There are very few instances where a regime has been overthrown by air strikes alone, without the deployment of ground troops. However, Israel, already engaged in an over 18-month-long war in Gaza, lacked the capacity to deploy troops in Iran. Unlike Gaza, Iran is a proper nation-state with a functioning and sophisticated military and a vast land area. Therefore, deploying ground troops would have been extremely costly for Israel in terms of both money and human lives. Hence, Israel’s second objective was difficult to achieve from the very beginning.

The Israeli attacks failed to fulfil both of its primary objectives. But the problems for Israel did not end there. Israel also suffered massive damage from Iran's ballistic missile and drone retaliation. With relatively modest military technology, Iran succeeded in striking deep inside Israel, hitting oil refineries, research centres, residential buildings, and military bases.

Former Trump advisor Steve Bannon even claimed that the ceasefire was necessary to save Israel, which he said was absorbing brutal hits and running low on defences. There have been more than 41,000 compensation claims filed for war-related damage in Israel.

Realist theories in international relations argue that the rise of a regional hegemon is likely to increase insecurity among other regional actors. As a result, these states may form alliances to counter the potential hegemon while simultaneously building up their own military capabilities, developments that are likely to fuel distrust between the hegemon and other regional actors, ultimately contributing to regional instability.

Thus, the weakening of Iran and the validation of Israel’s military strength, demonstrated by the significant damage it caused in Iran, have increased insecurity among Gulf regimes. They are now more likely to view Israel not as a partner to counter Iran, but as a threat capable of unleashing its advanced missiles on them. Arab regimes may conclude that they don’t have the freedom to develop weapons of their choice, as Israel will always ensure Arab states remain militarily subordinate to it. Hence, if Israel’s intention was to integrate into the region by capitalising on the Abraham Accords and weakening Iran, the attack has backfired. Israel is now more isolated in the region than before June 13. Since June 13, high-ranking officials of many Arab countries have directly talked with Iranian leaders, showing their support for Iran. Twenty-one major Arab and Muslim countries condemned the Israeli attack on Iran, and some even lobbied the United States to restrain Israel from launching further attacks. The expansion of the Abraham Accords seems impossible for the foreseeable future, as no Arab or Muslim country appears interested in normalising relations with Israel. While this trend had already begun due to the rising death toll from Israel’s brutal assault on Gaza, it has now been accelerated by its war on Iran.

Finally, the war between Israel and Iran has exposed weaknesses in the Israeli defence system, demonstrating how it can be bypassed. It has incentivised Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, while also giving the regime a new lease on life through a rising wave of nationalism. This has further increased Israel’s isolation and accelerated Iran’s regional integration, all of which are outcomes Israel had sought to prevent. Additionally, it is important for both Israel and the U.S. to understand that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons can only be effectively addressed through diplomatic efforts. The limitations of military strikes in resolving the issue of nuclear proliferation are well documented. Hence, it is the best bet for Israel and the U.S. to reconsider the diplomatic route, for the sake of regional security and a lasting resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue.